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The outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in the winter of 2002–
03 raised the specter of a new, unknown and uncontrollable infectious disease that 
spreads quickly and is often fatal. Certain branches of economic activity, notably 
tourism, felt its impact almost at once, and investor expectations of a safe and 
controlled investment climate were brought into question. Part of the shock of SARS 
was the abrupt reversal of a mounting legacy of disease control that had altered 
societies’ expectations from coping with waves of epidemics of smallpox, cholera, 
and measles, among other diseases, to complacency with the virtual elimination of 
disease epidemics. This paper analyzes the economic implications of the Great 
Plague in the fourteenth century, the 1918–19 influenza epidemic, HIV/AIDS and 
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1.  Introduction 
The outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in the winter of 2002-03 raised 
the specter of a new, unknown and uncontrollable infectious disease that spreads quickly and is 
often fatal.  Certain branches of economic activity, notably tourism, felt its impact almost at 
once and directly.  Yet such an event can have potentially much larger and widespread 
economic effects simply by changing expectations.  The unknown nature of the disease and 
duration of its outbreak introduced a strong element of uncertainty into the calculations of 
investors and policymakers alike.  In particular, there was the concern that the epidemic would 
slow economic growth in China and impede the flow of cheap imports into OECD markets.  In 
the event, it was swiftly brought under control by means of old-fashioned public health 
measures (isolation, quarantine and prohibition of travel); and the culprit, a corona virus, was 
identified by the most advanced methods within half a year. 
  SARS provides reminder of the importance of epidemics in recorded social and 
economic history. The well-documented past of Europe and China reveals waves of epidemics 
even in early times, and human remains from ancient Egypt suggest the presence of the same 
diseases. McNeill (1977), indeed, goes so far as to advance the thesis that epidemics often 
contributed to the rise and fall of empires, as well as determining the course of campaigns of 
conquest.  The great event of this kind, from a demographic, social and economic standpoint, 
was the outbreak of the Black Death in medieval Europe in 1347, which carried off about a 
third of the population within four years. Cohn (2002) observes that this catastrophe was soon 
followed, not only by the general optimism and individualism of the Renaissance, but also by 
the growing conviction, in medical and literate circles at least, that its causes lay not in God’s 
wrath or the position of the stars, but rather in this natural world.   
This conviction opened the way to scientific progress in understanding the nature and 
transmission of disease, which served as the basis for the development of effective methods of 
prevention and treatment.  The great improvements in economic welfare that have occurred  
over the past two centuries and more have been associated with, and have owed much to, the 
decline of communicable diseases.  This latter development stemmed, in turn, from the 
implementation of strikingly successful measures to combat these diseases. By the second half 
of the 20
th Century, the combination of knowledge, experience and medical technology had   3
produced a sharp drop in the incidence of epidemics, and with it the confident expectation that 
infectious diseases could, and would, be largely conquered within a lifetime. 
  This confidence had been shaken long before SARS burst onto the scene; for in the late 
1970s, numerous cases of a new and almost invariably fatal disease had begun to appear in 
East Africa.  They signaled the outbreak of the great modern epidemic known as HIV/AIDS. 
Here, unlike SARS, no such clear-cut success can be claimed.  The very slow progression of 
the disease, its pathogen’s frequent mutations, and its principal mode of transmission, which 
involves a fundamental behavioral drive, do much to undermine the effectiveness of the usual 
public health measures.  Its established concentration among high-risk groups poses a constant 
threat to those of the uninfected who are ill-informed and unwary.  The development of drugs 
to treat and manage the course of the disease represents real medical progress, but an effective 
vaccine appears to be a long way off and an outright cure unlikely anytime soon.  AIDS and 
SARS are new, contrasting epidemics that not only confirm the value of experience gained in 
the past, but also confront societies with different problems.      
  In this paper, we confine ourselves largely to the economic effects of epidemics – itself 
a vast topic. In order to provide the necessary background, section 2 briefly sketches infectious 
diseases, their epidemiology and some selected examples of their contributions to history. 
Section 3 lays the groundwork with a discussion of the costs of morbidity and mortality, 
paying particular attention to communicability.  Four epidemics – the Black Death, the so-
called ‘Spanish’ influenza of 1918-19, HIV/AIDS and SARS – are then taken up in detail and 
compared in Section 4. There follows, in Section 5, an examination of the instruments of 
public policy and how best to employ them. The paper concludes by drawing together the main 
findings. 
 
2.  Epidemics and History 
An intuitive, rather loose, definition of an epidemic is a sudden, sharp increase in the incidence 
of a communicable disease, which afflicts a large number of people in a relatively short period 
of time. While this conveys the general idea, we shall need something more precise for the 
discussion in the sections that follow.
1 A communicable disease must, in the nature of things, 
                                                 
1 The definition of an epidemic is a surprisingly controversial matter.  Originally reserved for communicable 
disease outbreaks, epidemiologists now routinely apply the term to other health risk factors, like obesity, and have   4
have a reservoir on which it can draw, or it will have become extinct. The reservoir usually 
takes the form of infected individuals, human or even animal; but it can also be a phial in a 
laboratory, which is now the last refuge of the smallpox virus. At any given time, the disease 
may be dormant, in the sense that there are no current clinical cases and those who happen to 
carry it are both immune and currently non-infectious. At the other extreme, the prevalence of 
the disease in a particular population may be significant, while fluctuating a bit about a roughly 
constant level. In close keeping with normal usage, we shall define the latter situation as one in 
which the disease is endemic. Both cases are effectively steady states – though not necessarily 
stable ones. It is then natural to say that an epidemic begins as a sudden, sharp increase in the 
incidence of a disease, starting from some steady state. The course of the epidemic is the 
trajectory of the prevalence rate from the initial to the final steady state, which need not be the 
same.   For the disease may establish itself endemically in what was previously ‘virgin 
territory’, as in the case of malaria and other diseases in the Americas following European 
conquest and the transportation of slaves from Africa.   Spanish influenza, in contrast, burst 
upon the scene, ran its global course within a couple of years, and has not reappeared in the 
specific form since. 
Epidemics only occur when there is a sufficiently large pool of uninfected people to 
contract and transmit the disease, that is to say, there must be a large enough reservoir of 
potential victims (or “susceptibles”) for the disease to spread.  For example, epidemiological 
models suggest that a minimum population of 250,000 is required to support a measles 
epidemic (Hunter, 2003).  As it spreads, the disease uses up the available pool of 
“susceptibles” in two ways: by killing them, or, if they survive, by conferring immunity on 
them. At some point, it may burn itself out; but it can survive at low levels and reemerge later 
as a new epidemic, either in its original form or as a more deadly mutation.  For an outbreak to 
develop into a global epidemic, the number of carriers must be large.  Urban crowding assists 
in efficient transmission, and geographic mobility enlarges the stock of “susceptibles”, as was 
the case with influenza in 1918-19 and SARS in 2003. 
The pathogens themselves include viruses, bacteria and parasites.  Most of them 
emerge from cross-species transmission: smallpox and TB from cattle, malaria, HIV and 
                                                                                                                                                          
introduced multiple qualifiers, so muddying the definition.  There are also no set rules as to when an outbreak 
becomes an epidemic.  There is agreement on the term pandemic, however: it is an epidemic that has crossed 
national borders.   5
yellow fever from primates, and measles from dogs or deer.  Transmission to humans will 
occur if a human virus mutates when exposed to animal viruses of the same family (Hull, 
1963; Diamond, 1997).  SARS, which is caused by a corona virus, is believed to be transmitted 
via wild animals (e.g., masked palm civits and raccoon dogs).  Other species of animals are 
also carriers, though they may be immune to the disease. The modes of transmission of the 
diseases themselves are diverse: airborne (influenza, diphtheria, whooping cough, SARS), 
contact with blood and other bodily fluids (HIV/AIDS, typhoid), the ingestion of pathogens 
(cholera), and insect bites (bubonic plague, malaria, yellow fever).  While some infectious 
diseases, such as the common cold, normally do little more than make their sufferers a bit 
miserable for a few days, others often cause serious morbidity (illness) and mortality.   
  Cholera, smallpox, measles, malaria and TB have been part of mankind’s history.  
Malaria afflicted both primates and the first humans, and among its known victims are 
numbered Roman emperors, St. Augustine and Oliver Cromwell.  Smallpox lesions and 
evidence of tuberculosis have been found on Egyptian mummies, although the populations of 
those kingdoms of the Nile are thought to have been too small to sustain major epidemics.  
Elsewhere in the ancient world, there is evidence of epidemics among the Hittites (1346 B.C.) 
and Athenians (490 B.C.), whose populations were larger.   India, China, Korea and Japan 
suffered epidemics of smallpox in the first six centuries A.D. (Hunter, 2003). 
Wars, migration, trade, famine and social chaos drive epidemics, bringing diseases to 
virgin populations.  In war, it was often the soldiers themselves who were most at risk. Half a 
million soldiers died in an outbreak of smallpox in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 
(Morgan, 2002). In the British invasion of Cartagena during the War of Austrian Succession 
(1740-48), over 90 percent of the soldiers were felled by yellow fever, a disease unknown in 
Europe and to which Britons had no immunity (ibid.).   In the Crimea War (1845-56), ten times 
as many British soldiers died from dysentery than from enemy bullets, and in the Boer War 
(1899-1902), the ratio was still five to one.  A harbinger of future successful efforts to control 
disease among soldiers emerged during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-06).  The Japanese 
used sanitation measures and vaccination to prevent epidemics among their soldiers, and lost to 
disease only a quarter of the number killed in battle (McNeill, 1977). 
The conquest of the Americas by Europeans can be traced to the propagation of 
infectious disease as much as to superior weaponry and military organization.  The Spanish   6
and British explorers and adventurers, naturally immune themselves, carried with them a range 
of diseases, notably smallpox and measles, to which the native peoples lacked any immunity. 
In North America, communities were small and isolated, making it hard for communicable 
diseases to be sustained.  In Mexico and Peru, however, populations were concentrated in large 
cities that were beginning to reach the required carrying capacity, though despite their 
densities, communicable diseases had remained virtually absent.  They were therefore highly 
vulnerable to the new infectious diseases brought by the Europeans (Diamond, 1997; McNeill, 
1977; Fenn, 2002). Between 1519 and 1620, it is estimated that Mexico’s population declined 
from 28 to 1.6 million due to waves of measles, smallpox, typhus and influenza.  In subsequent 
centuries, new diseases arrived.  African slaves introduced yellow fever to the New World, and 
in a disastrous series of outbreaks in the mid-18
th Century New Orleans and Memphis lost half 
their populations to the disease.  As these diseases wiped out the Amer-Indian population, the 
areas were subsequently settled by African populations, whose immune systems were adapted 
to both yellow fever and malaria (Hunter, 2003; McNeill, 1977). 
Illiffe (1995) contends that waves of epidemics wiped out much of North Africa’s 
population so regularly that the conditions of economic progress could never be established in 
that region.  During the 4
th Century, twenty waves of bubonic plague in Egypt reduced the size 
of the population by 50-75 percent.  Similar epidemics decimated other settlements in North 
Africa, undermining its dominance of trade and economic activity across the Mediterranean.  
The rise of prosperity in Egypt and Algeria in the 19
th Century can be traced to the 
disappearance of the plague (the reasons for which are not known), vaccinations against 
smallpox and the resulting rise in population. 
 
3.  The Costs of Morbidity and Mortality 
All forms of ill-health bring costs of one sort or another in their train, the nature and burden of 
which depend heavily on two factors: first, whether the ailment in question proves to be fatal to 
those who suffer from it, and secondly, whether it is infectious. Although it is infectious 
diseases that concern us here, we begin by laying out the costs that arise from a single episode 
of individual illness or injury of any kind, restricting attention to that individual. Only then do 
we extend the account to deal with what happens when the individual can communicate the 
disease to others.   7
  In sorting out the various effects, it will be helpful to consider two extreme examples. 
A young, unmarried woman twists her ankle so badly that she is confined to bed for a week, 
but she then makes a full and rapid recovery from her injury. The resulting costs are of broadly 
three types. Her absence from her job entails a fall in the value of output. Treating the injury 
makes a direct claim on resources, in the form of a visit to the emergency room for x-rays and 
a bottle of ibuprofen to relieve the swelling and pain. Thirdly, there are what can be thought of 
as the intangibles, in this case, the misery caused by the pain and the loss of a weekend of 
leisure among friends. Who actually bears these costs – it bears emphasizing that they must be 
borne by some party or other – depends on her insurance coverage from public and private 
sources. In most affluent economies, she will be granted sick leave with pay and her employer 
will lose the value of her output for the week.  The whole, or at least the greater part, of the 
costs of treatment will usually be covered by insurance, either private or public; but the 
intangible costs of illness and disability she must bear herself.  
  Now consider, in contrast, a married male in his mid-thirties with two small children, 
who suffers a heart attack so massive that he is unable to resume working at all before he 
succumbs to a second and fatal one. All of his future output, dating from the time of the first 
attack to expected retirement, with a suitable adjustment for ‘normal’ morbidity and mortality 
during that span of life, is thereby lost. The long treatment in the intensive care unit after the 
first attack, the extensive efforts at rehabilitation that followed and the final, vain effort to 
resuscitate him after the second attack are correspondingly expensive. The only ‘saving’ under 
this heading is the expected costs that would arise from the treatment and care of his ailments 
in old age, which he fails to reach, and the pay out of social security earned at retirement. The 
costs of the intangibles are no less sobering. The physical pain is accompanied by his inner 
struggle to come to terms with the prospect of an early death and what that will mean for his 
spouse and children. For them, there is not only the grief at his death, but also the enduring loss 
of his love, companionship and particular contribution to family life and child-rearing. 
Insurance arrangements might suffice to cover the first two, but cannot, in the nature of things, 
fully deal with the last. 
  These examples illustrate the importance of the family as an institution for, among 
other things, the pooling of resources. Even in a welfare state, membership in the family carries 
with it advantages and burdens that the larger society cannot fully smooth out. If the lost   8
earnings and the cost of medical treatment are not fully covered by insurance arrangements, 
then one individual’s illness will directly and adversely affect the well-being of other members, 
particularly the children, whose formal education may well suffer. Yet even if the available 
insurance arrangements can eliminate these particular direct effects at the level of the family 
and the family itself is willing to pay the requisite insurance premium, the intangible costs will 
still remain. In the second example, it is perhaps the children who stand to lose most.  This 
applies, mutatis mutandis, with undiminished force if the mother were to die early. These inter-
generational effects imply that premature mortality among parents does potential long-term 
damage that goes well beyond the calculations involving their own lost earnings and the costs 
of treating their final illness, regardless of whether that illness is an infectious one.   
  With an eye on the sections to follow, it will be useful to formulate the elements of the 
above discussion in a somewhat more general way. As a reference case, one can think of an 
‘ideal’ trajectory, along which the individual enjoys robust good health throughout an 
untroubled childhood, a long and productive working life, and a full old age, and then dies 
suddenly and peacefully in an armchair. Each episode of illness disturbs this trajectory in some 
measure, perhaps catastrophically. The episode may have no lasting effects; or it may so 
damage the individual’s constitution as to increase the chances of various illnesses in the 
future, possibly with a fatal outcome; or it may itself be fatal. Depending on its nature, it brings 
with it one or more of the immediate effects set out above, to which must be added the 
expected value of the future costs that will arise if the present episode increases the chances of 
illness in the future, as happens, for example, when a childhood illness arrests the development 
of an organ.  
  What additional considerations come into play if the disease is infectious? The 
immediate consequence is the risk that the sick individual will infect others, who will go on to 
propagate it in their turn. There is therefore a further chain of expected costs, whose magnitude 
depends not only on the damage the disease does to each individual, but also on the probability 
that it will be transmitted. So long as that probability is at all positive, the illness is not a purely 
private matter for the infected individual and those of the immediate family who share in a 
common economic fortune, as set out in the second example above. Rather, the infection has a 
certain public character, in that the infected person can, wittingly or otherwise, transmit the 
disease to others without their consent or even without their knowledge. Any case of a   9
communicable disease therefore generates, at least potentially, negative externalities. If 
transmission does occur, the parties contracting the infection will often become aware of the 
fact only after the event, and no doubt would have rejected the transaction had they been aware 
that it was ‘on offer’ at the time. The very fact that the threat of transmission exists will itself 
cause costs to arise, to the extent that measures are taken to ward it off.    
  Thus far, we have implicitly treated the aggregate costs of morbidity and mortality as 
the sum of the costs arising from individual cases, the timing and number of which depend on 
the prevalence of (infectious) diseases and the age structure of the population. This procedure 
is not fundamentally invalid if everything is correctly measured, but it does raise the question 
of how prices – and especially factor prices – depend on the levels of morbidity and mortality. 
In order to pursue this question, we suppose that there is some prevailing, ‘normal’ pattern of 
morbidity and mortality in the population, which provides the necessary benchmark. A single, 
additional case of a disease causes a very small disturbance to this pattern, and hence will have 
a negligible effect upon current and future prices – unless it arouses the suspicion that many 
more cases will follow, a possibility we shall take up in a moment. An actual epidemic, in 
contrast, produces a measurable change in overall morbidity and mortality, however 
temporary. The associated effects on the structure of relative prices depend not only on its 
duration, but also on which age groups suffer most.  
An epidemic among children has no immediate effect on economic output, fully 
measured, though resources will surely be diverted from other uses to treat and care for them. 
Gross domestic product could therefore fall in the short run, as parents stay away from work to 
devote more time and energy to their stricken children. There can be long-term effects on the 
aggregate supply of labor and skills if the epidemic is a long one and fertility does not rise to 
‘replace’ those children who die, or if some of those who survive are left mentally or 
physically weakened by the encounter.  
An epidemic among young adults has wider and more profound consequences. As the 
illness takes hold, there is an immediate reduction in the supply of labor, but without any 
attendant effects on the stock of physical capital in all its forms; so that the wage rate will tend 
to rise unless there is a sufficiently large pool of unemployed workers. Disability or death will 
make reductions in the supply of labor permanent. An increase in mortality in this group is also 
very likely to lead to lower fertility, and hence to a smaller labor force in future. The other   10
channel through which such an epidemic can affect the long-run supply or quality of the labor 
force is through its effect on the formation of children’s human capital. The end result is a 
reduction, not in the size of the future workforce, but rather in its quality. Determining what 
happens to the accumulation of physical capital is a complicated matter. Higher mortality 
among young adults and the lower fertility that attends it will reduce the rate of growth of the 
labor force. At the same time, a marked and prolonged increase in morbidity will very likely 
divert savings away from investment in all types of capital into treatment of the sick; and the 
loss of lifetime family income will normally reduce savings. Hence, whether an epidemic of 
this kind brings about an increase or a fall in the level of physical capital per worker remains 
an open question.  
An epidemic among the elderly has a direct effect on labor supply only to the extent 
that the elderly work or devote some of their time to caring for their grandchildren and their 
adult children’s households, whereby the diversion of resources into treatment of those who 
fall sick also occurs. The magnitude of the long-term effects of morbidity and mortality among 
the old on labor supply and its quality will depend on the strength of two factors, which pull in 
opposite directions. There is the extent to which these contributions to younger households 
further fertility and the formation of human capital. At the same time, there are the claims of 
the old on resources, which compete with investment in human and physical capital alike. 
To complete this brief account of the general workings of epidemics on the economy, 
two are particularly worthy of attention. If the scale and gravity of an outbreak are large and 
enduring, the whole structure of insurance arrangements could be burdened to the point of 
collapse. This applies not only to the capacity of the health system itself to deal with a flood of 
the sick and dying, but also to the very institutions that provide public services and other forms 
of health insurance. Affluent societies, with adequate public revenues, are better placed to deal 
with such a shock than poor ones, which rely heavily on the extended family and local 
communities for support in times of difficulty. The collapse of these institutions could well 
result in very large economic and social costs indeed.  
An outbreak of an infectious disease does not have to occur on a grand scale, however, 
in order to produce large economic effects. For economic activity depends heavily on 
expectations and psychological sentiment, the formation of which can, in turn, be very 
susceptible to reports of a disease outbreak.  It may take a while, depending on the nature of   11
the disease and the location of the outbreak, before the true scale of the threat becomes clear; 
so that expectations in the interim can err in both ways. Should the appearance of a new 
disease or a new variant of an old one prove to have grave and enduring consequences for 
morbidity and mortality in a population, the associated risks will eventually be embodied in the 
population’s expectations and hence in its members’ decisions concerning the allocation of 
resources. Erroneous or not, expectations play a central role. 
 
4.  The Economic Impacts of Four Epidemics 
The economic impacts of epidemics are broad ranging; some of them are quantifiable, but 
many are not.  The relationship between the costs inflicted on individual households and those 
on the society in aggregate can vary considerably across epidemics, as can that between the 
direct and indirect costs, and that between the long and short term effects (Lewis, 2001).  The 
historical context also matters.  Demographic factors played a decisive role in determining the 
general level of economic activity during medieval times, whereas modern epidemics occur in 
a world with instant information, and so can affect business confidence even when the 
attendant death toll is small and far away.  Other key influences are the nature of the disease, 
the duration of the epidemic, and the socioeconomic groups affected.  For reference, Table 1 
summarizes key characteristics of five major infectious diseases that have left their mark on 
societies: HIV/AIDS, influenza, bubonic plague, malaria and SARS.
2  This section pieces 
together the experiences of four of them to arrive at general conclusions.   
   
4.1 The Black Death   
The plague that swept through Europe between 1347 and 1351 changed the social and 
economic face of the medieval system and proved to be a major event in European history. In 
carrying off a quarter to a third of the population, it also constituted a (grim) natural laboratory 
experiment, the lessons from which are still being drawn. 
  Economic and demographic developments in the previous two centuries had left the 
entire system vulnerable to an external shock. A warming of the climate that had begun early 
                                                 
2 Diseases of historical importance that have been eradicated (smallpox) or can be controlled through 
immunization (yellow fever, hepatitis B, typhoid), better hygiene (typhoid, TB) and simple treatments (cholera) 
are not included, but possess some of the same characteristics as those in the table.  In many cases these diseases, 
as is true of the disease in the table, reoccur, usually due to lapses in surveillance, lax interventions once 
identified, or simply mutations or adaptations of the infectious disease agent.    12
in the 12
th Century – there is evidence of viticulture in Yorkshire, for example – led to 
improvements in yields and a substantial increase in the population. There were only very 
modest improvements in underlying technology, and marginal lands were increasingly brought 
under the plow. Another qualitatively important change in this period was the growing 
numbers of town-dwellers, who depended on transported grain and so were at greater risk of 
suffering malnutrition and disease when food was in short supply.  Towards the end of the 13
th 
Century, the cooling phase of the climatic cycle set in, and the first two decades of the 14
th 
Century were marked by cold, wet weather and poor harvests.   Food scarcity and starvation 
followed the famine of 1315-1317, leaving the population susceptible to disease. The grain 
monoculture and the failure to invest in community granaries for the storage of surpluses for 
lean years exacerbated these problems. A decline in marriage rates and high morbidity led to 
declining birth rates and rising infant mortality (Genicot, 1966). Even before the Plague 
arrived, Europe’s total population had retreated by about ten percent from its peak at the close 
of the 13
th Century. The population was not only pressing in on the means of subsistence, but it 
was also seriously weakened by malnutrition and other diseases. With no immunity, it offered 
fertile territory to the Plague pathogen. 
Other factors were to propel the epidemic’s advance after its outbreak. By some 
accounts, black rats, upon which the infected fleas fastened and feasted, had proliferated in the 
preceding years. They were also – and remain – inveterate stowaways. This habit was to be 
particularly significant; for economic expansion in the previous two centuries had naturally 
given a strong impulse to international trade. There was a dense network of trade routes in the 
Mediterranean, and the passage through the Straits of Gibraltar allowed ships to carry cargoes 
– and rats – from the Mediterranean to ports in the British Isles and Northern Europe, whence 
the plague was to spread rapidly inland. Perhaps more significant still was a development on 
the biological front: the pathogen also mutated. From bubonic plague, which is transmitted by 
flea bites, arose pneumonic plague, a form transmitted by sneezing and coughing, a far more 
efficient and deadly means of transmission among humans.   
By the time the first wave had run its course, Europe had lost about a quarter to a third 
of its population, the proportion generally rising as one goes north. Even within regions, 
however, the severity of the blow was uneven: in Italy, mortality ranged from 50-70 percent 
mortality in some places (Siena lost three-quarters of its population) to 15-20 percent in others.   13
There is some fragmentary evidence that those who were poorly fed were more likely to be 
affected; but Cohn’s (2002) careful research suggests that all age- and income groups were 
equally affected. In subsequent waves, which were to recur periodically for the remainder of 
the century across Europe
3 and North Africa, the plague became increasingly a disease of 
children (Cohn, 2002)
4, with modest demographic effects.   
The ensuing upheaval also dealt the feudal system a blow from which it never 
recovered. Whole villages were depopulated, marginal land returned to scrub and pasture, the 
value of land plummeted, the marginal cost of agricultural production declined, and food 
supplies became more plentiful. The apparatus that had tied the serf to his lord’s manor was 
gravely weakened, and many feudal holdings were broken up due largely to the shift to more 
modern contractual arrangements.   Surviving tenants had the choice between taking on 
additional leases and moving away. Those without the means to cultivate could migrate to jobs 
in other villages and in the towns, where labor shortages expanded employment opportunities 
(Genicot, 1966; McNeill, 1977; Hirschleifer, 1987). 
In a recent paper, Clark (2003) analyses the plague’s effects on the course of factor 
prices (of land, labor and capital), and productivity.  His findings suggest that while real wages 
indeed rose after 1350, the return on capital declined (although this was a continuation of a 
long-term trend that began before the onset of the plague). Land rents fell somewhat and then 
fluctuated around this lower level. Clark goes on to show that the direct, longer term impact of 
the Black Death on the level of productivity in Europe was negligible.  It was not until the 
1600s that the signs of ‘modern’ growth appeared, due in large part to technological advances 
and the concomitant rises in agricultural productivity. These were unrelated to the plague.  
Hirschleifer (1987) attributes economic stagnation to recurrences of the plague over the 
                                                 
3 During the second half of the 14
th Century, London had 20 separate outbreaks of the plague (Genicot, 1966; 
Cohn, 2002). 
4 Cohn (2002) in his recent, meticulously researched book on the Black Death raises questions regarding the 
nature of subsequent bouts of the plague, and in particular whether they were indeed Bubonic or Pneumonic 
Plague.  He notes that in these later episodes, numerous physicians claimed success in treating the disease, 
something that was not true of the first wave.  Finally, he poses the conundrum of why the plague mutated in 
some places to a pneumonic form, but not in others.  He contends that the subsequent waves involved an entirely 
different infection that was improperly diagnosed, but was assumed to be a resurgence of the plague that hit 
Europe in 1347.   14
subsequent century, and secondarily to continued wars on the continent, notably the “Hundred 
Years War” between England and France.
5    
 
4.2 The Influenza Epidemic of 1918-19 
The exact origins of this virulent strain of influenza are not clear. What is known is that it 
swept across the globe in three waves – the second of which, in the fall of 1918, was the most 
deadly – in the space of a year or so, making hundreds of millions sick and sending 40 million 
or more to their graves (Potter, 2001). This severe shock turned out to be very short-lived, 
however; two years after the first recorded outbreak, the virus had disappeared.  
  The pattern, incidence and mortality of the epidemic in the U.S. have been the subject 
of some study. Initially characterized by U.S. public health officials as “only influenza”, the 
military congregated army recruits in Army camps prior to shipping them off to Europe.  The 
disease killed many soldiers before they ever reached Europe, and it spread rapidly upon their 
arrival (Barry, 2003).  By the time the epidemic had run its course, one quarter of the U.S. 
population had contracted the disease and 675,000 (0.66 percent of the total population) had 
died.  Influenza usually carries off children and the aged, and many of them did indeed die.  A 
salient feature of the 1918-19 strain, however, is that it caused an especially sharp rise in 
mortality among adults in their prime years (ages 15-44), so that the age-specific mortality 
profile temporarily assumed a ‘W’-shape.
6 The inner ‘spike’ was especially sharp among adult 
men, a fact that has been attributed to higher rates of latent tuberculosis among males.  The 
aggregate result was an abrupt decline in life expectancy at birth of about 12 years for both 
sexes, followed by a rapid recovery, especially among males (Noymer and Garenne, 2000). 
  Despite the absolute scale of the mortality, this epidemic has not received much 
attention from economists.  Recently, Brainerd and Siegler (2003) attempt to assess its effects 
on the U.S. economy using one measure of performance, namely, the growth of real per capita 
income.  They employ so-called growth regressions, exploiting the fact that data are available 
on death rates due to influenza and pneumonia (a very common complication) in thirty states 
                                                 
5 Bloom and Majal (1997) analyze wage fluctuations and their impact on economic growth in England and 
France, and find no significant effects of the Great Plague on output.  However, their analysis was constrained by 
small sample size and the results are inconclusive. 
 
6 This feature was also found in all other populations for which there are reliable records (see Brainerd and 
Siegler, 2003, p. 6).   15
for the period 1918-19. These data are combined with a variety of economic variables, chief 
among them the initial level of real per capita income.  As the authors note, the data are not 
ideal for this purpose. The levels of real per capita income in this disaggregated form are 
available for the two time-points 1919-21 and 1930. Since the outbreak occurred in 1918, what 
is really needed are data for the immediately preceding years.  A confounding factor is the 
short recession in 1919 and the swift recovery that followed. The Great Depression, which 
started to take hold in 1930, rules out any examination of a longer span.  Hence, Brainerd and 
Siegler confine their analysis to the medium run, with a decade as the unit of time.    
  Controlling not only for the level of a state’s real per capita income in 1919-21, but also 
for a variety of other factors – its climate, population density, schooling, proportion of the 
foreign-born population, membership in the Confederacy and initial share of income derived 
from agriculture –, the authors arrive at a robust and statistically significant finding: the higher 
the death rate due to influenza and pneumonia in 1918-19, the greater the proportional increase 
in real per capita income between 1919-21 and 1930.    One explanation is that the heavy, but 
short-lived concentration of deaths among the most productive age groups in 1918-19 caused 
an immediate reduction in real per capita income, a shock from which the level of the latter 
progressively recovered over the years that followed, and so resumed its earlier long-term path. 
The larger the shock, the stronger was the transient element representing the recovery. In the 
absence of data for the years leading up to the outbreak, however, it is hard to see how any 
explanation of the authors’ main finding can be properly tested. What can be said is that, unlike 
the case of a full-blown AIDS epidemic, the shock was not only temporary, but also relatively 
small; so that there was little danger of the outbreak tipping the economic system into a 
different regime, a possibility that we take up in section 4.3 in connection with AIDS. 
  There are also two noteworthy studies of the effects of the epidemic on India, at that 
time an almost wholly agrarian economy. In the course of his classic treatise on backward 
agriculture, Schultz (1964) was concerned to demonstrate that, even in that setting, labor is 
almost always scarce, in the sense of having a positive marginal product. The epidemic offered 
a useful natural experiment to test this hypothesis, and the decennial census of 1921 was 
conveniently timed to permit a key part of the measurement. Schultz estimated that the 
agricultural labor force and output fell by 8 percent and 3.3 percent, respectively. In a more 
recent study, Bloom and Mahal (1997) examine the relationship between changes in the   16
acreage sown and the reduction in population across 13 provinces, and find none.  It might be 
argued that sown area is a closer measure of labor inputs than output, the latter being more 
heavily influenced by the weather and growing conditions.  “Sown area” in India, however, 
was (and still is) much more dependent on draft animals than field laborers, many of whom 
could turn their hand to the plow if needed.  The basis of Schultz’s (1964) findings is more 
persuasive, and we conclude that influenza did indeed have a negative effect on economic 
output in India.  
 
4.3 HIV/AIDS 
The HIV virus is thought to have mutated from non-human primates in Africa, perhaps around 
the middle of the last century. The virus strain made its way into human populations in parts of 
central Africa by the early 1970s.  By the early 1980s, the disease was beginning to claim large 
numbers of prime-aged victims with such clear, common symptoms as to arouse the suspicion 
that a new and mysterious infectious disease had broken out.  The first stream of cases in 
affluent societies began to appear among homosexual men, intravenous drug users and 
hemophiliacs in the 1980s. It was only after the virus had been identified in 1984 that its modes 
of transmission and the progression of the resulting disease known as AIDS to certain death 
became fully understood.  Two decades later, the pandemic has assumed alarming proportions. 
According to UNAIDS (2003), 38 million people are infected, 3 million are dying annually, 
and 4.8 million new infections (630,000 of them children) occur each year. The cumulative 
death toll has reached at least 25 million worldwide, and AIDS has killed more people than any 
other communicable disease over the last two decades.   
  The course of the illness in an infected adult is insidious, long and ultimately fatal, with 
a median time between infection and death, if untreated, of about a decade. The onset of 
symptoms signals a phase of increasingly severe morbidity, which can be treated through a 
constant, rigorous and carefully monitored regime of anti-retroviral therapy (ART) and 
treatment of opportunistic infections.  As a sexually transmitted disease, HIV/AIDS has struck 
mainly young adults, whose premature deaths are leaving behind an ever-growing number of 
orphans. Some of their children are destined to suffer what is arguably a still crueler fate.  A 
newborn has about a 30 percent chance of contracting the disease at birth if the mother is sero-
positive and Neviropine is not administered pre-natally. The threat of transmission continues   17
with breast-feeding.  With an immature immune system, infected infants typically die within a 
couple of years in the absence of extensive and costly ARV treatment. 
The microeconomic effects of the epidemic are both evident and, to a substantial 
extent, measurable.  Individual households are severely affected when they must cope with the 
consequences of sick, debilitated and dying family members. The rising burden of health-care 
costs and the declining productivity of adults, who are the breadwinners and family managers, 
combine to bring the household into acute financial difficulties (Bloom and Majal, 1997; 
Lewis, 2001). The death of one or more adults results in a drastic loss of lifetime family 
income and perhaps the dissolution of the household itself. To the extent that other families 
help out financially or take in the children, the burden is spread, but not diminished.  
As argued in Section 3, there are also the more subtle, but potentially very important, 
long-term effects on the formation of human capital, as the children lose the love, guidance and 
support of one or both parents. These elements of child-rearing complement and often promote 
formal education, and those children who lack them are arguably ill-equipped for 
independence or the working world. Some recent empirical work supports the view that these 
adverse effects are indeed substantial.  A study of Indonesian children shows that orphans are 
less healthy, less likely to go to school, and overall less prepared for life (Gertler, Levine and 
Martinez, 2003).  In a comparison of 19 African countries, Case, Paxson and Ableidinger 
(2003) find that orphans live in poorer households and are significantly less likely than non-
orphans to be enrolled in school. The sheer scale of orphan-hood caused by AIDS is becoming 
rather daunting. As of early 2003, 12 million children in Sub-Saharan Africa, a sizable part of 
the cohort on which Africa’s future depends, had lost at least one parent to AIDS (UNAIDS, 
2003).  According to another estimate, 12-20 percent of children under the age of 15 in 
Lesotho and Swaziland will be orphaned by 2010 (Haacker, 2002).   
Morbidity and mortality among young adults and those in their prime years also affect 
firms. Business costs rise due to the high personnel turnover caused by AIDS, though Haacker 
(2002) concludes that the effects on productivity and output in southern Africa are not 
empirically clear.  He does argue that the health sector will be put under severe strain, as the 
cost of treating AIDS patients and their associated opportunistic infections rises dramatically 
and members of already strapped medical staffs themselves succumb to AIDS. Expenditures   18
on such treatments are expected to double in the next few years, with all that entails for the 
government’s budget.  
At the level of the entire economy, various efforts to pin down the epidemic’s direct, 
aggregate effects on economic activity have revealed at most only a modest impact, especially 
in the short to medium term. Indeed, most attempts at macroeconomic modeling in the 1990s 
yielded virtually no economic effects at all (Bloom and Majal, 1997; Lewis, 2001).  In view of 
the fact that the scale of morbidity and mortality has remained relatively modest in many 
countries until very recently, that is not wholly surprising; but there are now clear hints of 
damage in the making. Arndt and Lewis (2000), for example, estimate that between 1997 and 
2010, the AIDS epidemic in South Africa will reduce that country’s GDP by 17 percent and its 
per capita income by about 8 percent (or about 0.6 percent annually). There would be little 
effect on the scarcity of low-skilled workers, however, because initial unemployment levels 
among that group were already high at the start.  MacFarlan and Sgherri (2002) model the 
likely macroeconomic impacts of AIDS in Botswana and conclude that the growth rate of GDP 
in the non-mining sector will slow by a third or more between 2000 and 2010 due to expected 
reductions in labor productivity and capital accumulation, these stemming in part from a 
decline in the experience and skills of formal sector workers.  A heavy fiscal impact from 
higher health spending is also projected. 
   Over the long run, the effect of AIDS on per capita income will make itself felt both 
through its destruction of existing human capital, a good part of which takes the form of 
experienced workers, and its weakening of the mechanisms through which new human capital 
is accumulated.  Many countries have already lost a significant number of their highly 
educated citizens, and the prospects remain grim. The longer term effects of a prolonged and 
severe epidemic are likely to be both very damaging and broad, as investment in the human 
capital of orphaned and needy children falters.  These ramifications will take decades to make 
themselves felt in full, not only because of the slow progression of AIDS (see Table 1), but 
also because 15-20 years must pass for the knock-on effects to be evident in the children of its 
victims.  When they reach full force, they could be devastating if the current course of the 
epidemic in Southern Africa continues unabated (Bell, Devarajan and Gersbach, 2004).    
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4.4 SARS 
Measured by the yardstick of global mortality and morbidity, SARS must be judged 
unimportant. Yet its economic consequences, though short-lived, were not trivial. They 
stemmed from both the stern public health measures undertaken to contain the epidemic – 
somewhat paradoxically – and the volatile changes in expectations before it became clear that 
the outbreak was under control and the need for containment was temporary.  Media coverage 
also fueled concerns, making the outbreak an international event that effectively scared 
individuals, governments and businessmen alike. 
In February 2003, the Chinese Ministry of Health reported 305 cases of “atypical 
pneumonia” to the World Health Organization (WHO), but indicated that the outbreak was 
under control.  By the following month, cases exhibiting the same symptoms were reported in 
Hong Kong, Vietnam and other East Asian countries, and epidemiological surveillance experts 
from WHO and its member countries were attempting to contain the spread of what was 
clearly a communicable disease, which WHO had by then christened Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS). 
  From November 2002, when the first cases occurred in Guandong Province, until July 
5, 2003, when WHO announced that “the last chain of transmission was broken”, a total of 
8422 probable cases, 916 of them fatal, were reported from 29 countries.  While China 
reported the largest percentage and number of cases (5327), the incidence rates among the 
population were highest in Hong Kong and Taiwan due to their much smaller populations and 
extensive contacts with China.  The crude case fatality rates (CFR) ranged from zero to 50 
percent, depending on the location, age and health of those infected, with most countries’ 
CFRs in the 10-17 percent range.  The elderly were particularly susceptible.  In Canada the 
crude CFR was 16.7 percent, but 83 percent for those over the age of 60.  The contrast was 
scarcely less dramatic in Hong Kong: the CFR for those under age 25 was zero, but 52 percent 
for those over age 65.  Although the numbers of cases were relatively small, particularly in 
some countries, there is the generally consistent finding that age and poor health were among 
the most important factors in raising the risk of mortality (WHO, 2003).  The other at-risk 
group was health workers, who made up 18.2 percent of the reported cases in China and almost 
half of those in Canada. SARS was very much an occupational hazard.   20
  The disease was first transmitted via food handlers (who obtain and butcher animals, 
sell their meat, or prepare and serve food), and subsequent transmission occurred primarily 
among individuals in close contact with infected patients in hospitals, hotels and households.  
The pattern of infection reflects the mode of transmission, namely, through infectious, 
respiratory droplets that enter mucous membranes (eyes, nose and mouth), so that others within 
a radius of a few meters of an infected individual are at risk. The infectiousness of the disease 
is illustrated by the fact that a single case in Guangshou city resulted in transmission in two 
hospitals and 82 new cases (ibid.).  
  The rapid epidemiological response led not only to a very successful campaign to 
contain the outbreak, but also to a strikingly early discovery of the pathogen.  Within a matter 
of a few months, Canadian researchers had identified it as a corona virus, linked the agent to 
animal populations, and decoded its genome structure.  Until the appearance of this variety, 
corona viruses had been associated with mild illnesses that posed a minimal threat to humans.  
The transmission from animal to man likely followed the familiar path of an animal virus 
mixing with a mutated human virus, a common occurrence in influenza and other airborne 
diseases (WHO, 2003). If the disease is indeed zoonotic (transferred from animal to man), the 
virus will remain in animal reservoirs, where it may mutate and strike again.   
  Travel bans were put in place for the major affected areas in April – China generally, 
led by Hong Kong and Guangdong Province, and other cities in Asia and North America 
followed, often on the heels of WHO’s designation as an epidemic city.  Almost half the 
planned flights to Southeast Asia were cancelled during the month of April.  Total arrivals 
declined by about two-thirds over the course of the crisis (Siu and Wong, 2003), with 
corresponding effects on related parts of the economy, mainly hotels, restaurants and even 
shipping. Business deals and arrangements were also postponed. Many of these transactions 
involve inherently perishable goods, such as a hotel room or a passenger seat, the use of which 
cannot always be made up through mere postponement. In Hong Kong, both restaurants and 
retail trade are particularly heavily dependent on tourism, which declined by 10-50 percent 
over the period, with ripple affects throughout the economy, including a 50 percent drop in 
retail sales.  Across the entire region, tourism declined by 20-70 percent.
7  At the height of the 
                                                 
7 Even in unaffected Southeast Asian countries (e.g., Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia), tourism declined 15-35 
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epidemic, visitors and tourism declined 80 percent in Taiwan and almost as much in Singapore 
(Siu and Wong, 2003; Hanna and Huang, 2003; World Bank, 2003; Oxford Economic 
Forecasting).  
The effects were also felt in other branches worldwide. For example, Advanced Micro 
Devices Inc., a leader in technology, suffered a drop in revenues, posted losses over two 
quarters and faced a precarious cash flow situation, all due to SARS (Ojo, 2003). Nor should 
the supply side of the story be forgotten. In Taiwan, nearly a million people were quarantined 
in mid-May, and the inhabitants of many large cities in East Asia responded to the threat of 
infection by staying at home voluntarily.  Removing the related effects of the Iraq war, SARS 
cost the region nearly $15 billion, or 0.5 percent of GDP.   
  A less readily measurable, but arguably more serious, impact was caused by faltering 
business confidence.  Investors dislike uncertainty, and the uncontrolled outbreak of an 
unknown disease makes the investment environment an uncertain one, in the sense that the 
associated risks are not clear.  In the early phase, the perceived inability of the Chinese 
government to identify and contain a highly infectious disease surely generated uncertainty in 
this sense, and the widely reported deaths of nine foreign businessmen who had visited China 
provided subjective reinforcement. The premium on financial instruments for China-related 
investments provides a quantitative measure of the shift in confidence.  The Eurobond spreads 
in China declined precipitously, from 140 in early April to around 40 in August, suggesting 
wavering business confidence (Brahmbahatt, 2003; Hanna and Huang, 2003).    
International investors had good reasons to become particularly wary, for the initial 
bungling and attempts to cover up occurred on top of the Chinese government’s other failures 
in the realm of corporate governance and regulatory transparency.  These are just the actions 
that undermine investor confidence, and so deter foreign direct investment – an important 
matter in China, where roughly 55 percent of industrial production involves foreign 
investment.  The unfolding of events raises longer term questions about the reliability and 
predictability of conditions in China, and by extension other Southeast Asian economic 
partners.  Perceptions matter in business, and once established, may be hard to change. 
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Two of these four epidemics, namely, Spanish influenza in 1918 and SARS in 2003, broke out 
suddenly, spread rapidly and then petered out in less than a couple of years. They had very 
limited macroeconomic effects in relative terms, as the impact on aggregate mortality was 
relatively small.  Even though the former killed 40 million people worldwide, and so caused 
great individual suffering, with some households and communities incurring dramatic 
economic losses, it was still a small event when viewed globally.   
The first wave of the Black Death in the 14
th Century was also short-lived, but it carried 
off about a third of Western Europe’s population, and its recurrence over the subsequent 
century slowed economic growth and took a significant toll in mortality.  A final judgment on 
whether HIV/AIDS will rival the Black Death in this respect cannot yet be made. Viewed 
globally, the scale of associated mortality is small, though it has already produced a dramatic 
increase in deaths in Eastern and Southern Africa. The long-term character of the disease, the 
pattern and pace of the AIDS pandemic, its concentration among normally productive young 
adults and its undermining of long-term human capital formation all distinguish it from the 
other epidemics discussed here. If the African experience is repeated on other continents – 
most threatened are Asia and Eurasia – the economic damage will assume grave proportions 
  Sustained epidemics, or diseases that become endemic with high levels of prevalence, 
appear to constrain growth.  Medieval Europe, for example, functioned in an endemic disease 
environment where outbreaks of disease came and went with some regularity, killing large 
swaths of the population.  By the turn of the 14
th Century, stagnation had set in.  On the other 
hand, it can also be argued that the Black Death transformed medieval Europe in a positive 
way over the long term by undermining the economic, political and social status quo, thereby 
opening up new opportunities and establishing some of the preconditions for growth. 
   
5.  Public Policy: Prevention and Response 
Advances in knowledge about, and measures to contain, infectious diseases placed public 
health at the center of public policy-making.  Public health so defined encompasses the 
epidemiological, demographic, administrative, and other instruments of intervention needed to 
keep disease at bay. In this connection, it is clear from the discussion in section 2 that efforts to 
combat endemic communicable diseases heavily overlap those needed to combat epidemics.   23
For some measures that influence the prevalence rate in a steady state also influence both the 
probability that an epidemic breaks out and, should it do so, its subsequent course. 
  An analogy may be helpful. Building codes can influence both the probability that a 
fire breaks out and, if one does so, the speed with which it spreads and the chances that those 
inside at the time will escape unharmed. The communications network in the building will also 
raise the alarm in the local fire stations, and the fire crews will set out to rescue those still 
inside and bring the blaze under control. Now suppose smoking in buildings is banned and 
stringent standards for electrical circuitry are introduced. Both measures are purely preventive, 
in the sense that they affect only the probability that a fire will break out. Superior sprinkler 
systems and fire-retardant materials, while they do not prevent an outbreak, are still preventive 
measures in that they reduce the expected magnitude of the losses in the event of an outbreak; 
and the superior sprinkler system also provides an active response, in that it may douse the fire 
or at least keep it under control until the fire brigade arrives. Providing firemen with better 
training and equipment can be thought of as an improvement in the means of ‘pure’ response. 
All these belong in the arsenal of measures to deal with the hazard of fire, even though some of 
them are put into effect only when a fire breaks out. 
Returning to communicable diseases, the large and mobile populations of the modern 
world are inherently at risk.  The provision of clean water and sanitation, the vigorous 
implementation of vaccination programs, the control of disease vectors, and the promotion of 
health education are all essential both in preventing outbreaks and in containing them should 
they occur.  Two key components of public health systems complement these measures: first, 
an epidemiological surveillance apparatus to spot outbreaks and track the patterns of their 
spread; and second, the capability to respond immediately to an outbreak, both in identifying 
and managing its course. Effective implementation of these measures requires continuous and 
comprehensive monitoring, preparation for action and the resources to act when needed – 
including the imposition of isolation and quarantine.  Not only are they vital to the well-being 
of populations and to securing high levels of economic activity, but they are also relatively 
inexpensive: in the U.S., for example, just 1 percent of all public spending on health is 
allocated to public health.   
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5.1 Public Health   
It is instructive to begin with some historical examples of government action.  When the Black 
Death was at its peak, many communities simply dissolved into chaos, but others took 
concerted measures.  Some Italian cities established public health commissions, which were 
charged with a variety of functions: to quarantine (quarante die, or forty days) individuals 
thought to be infected, to cordon off infected areas, to inspect incoming traders, travelers and 
food, to collect data, and to handle the needs of affected families.  In some communities, they 
had powers to seize property, fumigate houses, set curfews and the times for public meetings, 
to name a few highly intrusive measures (Cohn, 2002; Hunter, 2003).  In the second half of the 
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th Century, sanitation engineers recognized the link between infectious disease and 
contaminated water.  The Thames embankment, for example, not only eliminated the threat of 
malaria, but also made it possible for diseases such as cholera and typhus to be brought under 
control. All these actions belong in the armory of measures available to modern governments.  
These newly controlled diseases also led to a series of international sanitary 
conferences starting in the mid-1800s, and resulted in a set of international health regulations 
that by 1951 were embodied in the charter for the creation of WHO.  SARS has given new 
impetus to planned revisions in these regulations for the new century, and some of the key 
lessons learned from that epidemic – use of syndromes not specific diseases to trigger action, 
accepting reports from official as well as private sources, and specific authority for WHO to 
act when governments fail to do so – provide a platform for significant updates. 
The 1918 influenza epidemic brought more public health improvements, notably new 
or revamped public health laws in many countries.  It also served to strengthen the health 
aspects of the League of Nations debates. 
  Advances in medicine have led to still more effective interventions to stem the spread 
of infectious diseases, principally through the ability to identify the agent, to develop vaccines 
and to treat those who fall sick.  At the same time, well-chosen combinations of old and new 
measures are often essential.  Information, outreach, tracking of partners and treatment are all 
vital in controlling sexually transmitted diseases.  The spike in TB in New York prisons, for 
example, alerted public health officials to the likely presence of HIV/AIDS among prisoners, 
and hence the need to check the spread of both TB and HIV/AIDS among the incarcerated and 
so hinder their eventual transmission into the general population.     25
  The virtues of a well-functioning system of public health are nicely illustrated by what 
happened in the SARS epidemic.  When a new, communicable pathology arises, isolating and 
quarantining patients is required while efforts are made to track those who have been in contact 
with the infected, and to trace the nature and source of the disease.  In China none of this was 
done.  Raised in a political and bureaucratic culture that discourages the reporting of problems, 
public health officials only very reluctantly raised the alarm, and the physician who did so was 
jailed.  The failure of information to flow between from provincial and national levels, the 
absence of epidemiological surveillance, and the slow response of the authorities to an 
apparently new pathogen allowed SARS to spread, first in China, and then beyond its borders. 
The Global Meeting on the Epidemiology of SARS, which was convened by WHO, endorsed 
standard public health practices quite unambiguously:  “early case identification and isolation, 
vigorous contact tracing, voluntary home quarantine of close contacts for the duration of the 
incubation period, and public information and education to encourage prompt reporting of 
symptoms” (WHO, 2003).  In doing so, it also delivered a rebuke, however indirectly, to the 
Chinese government. 
The timely involvement of WHO, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) and other entities with experience and expertise led to measures that averted a broader 
and more serious crisis.  These measures also had the immediate economic effects discussed in 
section 4.4 – the burden of which was relatively modest and fell mainly on China itself.  
But perverse effects have followed in the wake of SARS as well.  The media coverage 
portraying China as unable to control a raging communicable disease, combined with wavering 
business confidence in the wake of SARS, has led to China’s almost exclusive focus of its 
public health resources on epidemic response activities.  Consolidation of staffing in units 
devoted solely to epidemic management has been achieved at the expense of both basic public 
health maintenance functions and chronic disease management (Yach, 2004).   Nonetheless, 
the success in epidemic control, once the world was alerted, offers a success story.  Current 
actions simply bode poorly for future threats, and suggests that the public health lessons have 
been only partly internalized. 
  In contrast to the success in dealing with SARS, progress in stemming the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic has been uneven.  This troubling fact owes much to the latter’s distinct nature, and it 
reveals a pressing need to bring the tools of public health to bear on the problem in a more   26
effective way than hitherto.  Operating on behavioral factors is of paramount importance in 
preventing new infections.  For unlike cases of SARS or influenza, whereby infected 
individuals can be kept from coming in close contact with the healthy population through 
temporary isolation and quarantine, individuals infected with the HIV-virus are infectious for 
life. Effective quarantine therefore amounts to lifelong house arrest.  This may be a feasible 
policy at the early stages of the epidemic, but it raises thorny ethical issues.  At later stages, the 
numbers of individuals will be so large as to make it impractical.  With this measure ruled out, 
others assume greater importance.   
One major lesson of the last 15 years has been the need to address directly and publicly  
the disease’s existence, its modes of transmission, and the means to reduce the probability of 
infection; for the population’s ignorance of such things is the greatest barrier to its 
containment.  Some governments have been reluctant to launch full-scale public awareness 
campaigns, or even to target high risk groups, due to what are often dubbed cultural 
sensitivities associated with sexual matters.  Proposals to distribute condoms and make clean 
needles available to intravenous drug users (IVDU) have often met with similar stonewalling.  
Brazil and Thailand are notable exceptions.  Preventive measures in the form of intensive 
campaigns, the aggressive promotion and distribution of condoms, clean needle exchange 
programs, and the targeting of high risk groups with information, counseling and testing have 
enabled both countries to limit the spread of the disease and to focus resources on treating 
those already infected.   A number of other countries are catching up with these public health 
leaders. 
The experience in Africa has been mixed, with Uganda in particular an outlier, having 
established an early, effective intervention program.  Figure 1 provides a vivid contrast of 
Uganda’s relative success with disease control, and the fruits of inaction in Botswana, the 
former benefiting from effective and creative policies, the latter suffering from official denial 
of the problem – at least until very recently.   Although the disease took hold earlier in Uganda, 
prompt intervention translated into a slowing of prevalence after peaking at just above 30 
percent of pregnant women, the best indicator for tracking HIV/AIDS in the adult population.  
By comparison, following dramatic increases in HIV/AIDS infection for almost a decade, 
prevalence growth appears to be tapering off in Botswana, although it has already reached 
close to 45 percent of adults, the highest recorded level anywhere in the world.   27
Disease surveillance figures prominently in public health efforts to identify and control 
infectious diseases – indeed, successful and efficient prevention is scarcely possible without it.  
In the case of HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases, surveillance requires blood 
tests, which are often carried out during pre-natal care.  The debate over the ethical issues – the 
acceptability of universal blood tests for particular groups (in this case, for pregnant women), 
whether the mother should be informed of the results, and how follow-up should be managed –  
have raged for years.  From a public health perspective, there is the presumption that public 
welfare takes precedence over individual rights.  In developed countries, for example, the law 
requires that all children be vaccinated against communicable diseases to protect both the 
individual child and the public, especially other children.  Administering blood tests for 
HIV/AIDS, and conveying the results and their implications to patients, should follow similar 
rules.   In order to produce the public good in question, it is essential that the government have 
this knowledge and that those who test positive be informed – though it is also vital that 
individual privacy be strictly protected. 
Counseling and testing pregnant women reinforces the messages of the general 
campaign in a personal way.  Many of those found to be infected will be in the early stages, all 
those infected – and only those – will receive the medications that prevent transmission from 
mother to child, and these women will be in a position both to manage their illness and to 
prevent its further spread.  Although these steps cannot unaided achieve all the lofty goals for 
public surveillance and individual behavior change, they are necessary components of an 
effective and comprehensive program.  
Prevention is not only generally cheap; it is also the only effective means of stemming 
the AIDS epidemic in the long term.  For although anti-retroviral therapies extend life for some 
undetermined period, they neither cure the disease nor do they render infected individuals non-
infectious.  The populous countries of China, India and Russia need to take these lessons to 
heart.  All face the threat of an epidemic on the scale currently prevailing in Africa if they fail 
to confront this possibility; but the political will to grasp the nettle seems to be lacking, and 
prevention efforts are still minimal.  The result could well be a truly appalling toll of deaths, 
and misery and impoverishment for the survivors. 
 
5.2 Immunization     28
Another important tool for disease control is immunization, which prevents the transmission of 
a particular disease by rendering those immunized resistant to infection.  To give an important 
historical example, those who survived smallpox developed life-long immunity, and others 
were indirectly immunized by contracting cowpox through tending milk cows.
8  But for 
centuries the vast majority of the population remained susceptible to infection.  The fact that 
immunity can be conferred through exposure to small doses of the smallpox virus from an 
infected individual was known in China in the 11
th Century, even though the mechanism was 
not understood.  This knowledge spread westwards to Europe, and subsequently to Africa and 
the Americas.  Napoleon had his troops inoculate themselves against smallpox, as did 
Washington in his campaigns against the British (McNeill, 1977).  By the mid-1800s, Egypt 
was relying on barbers to vaccinate 80,000 children against smallpox each year (Iliffe, 1995).    
As the pathogens causing infectious diseases were steadily identified, systematic 
research into the development of vaccines became standard practice.  Vaccines against the 
important diseases of smallpox, typhus, cholera, mumps, whooping cough, diphtheria, polio 
and, more recently, hepatitis have been developed.  Although they vary in their degree of 
effectiveness and in the incidence and severity of their side-effects, none confers much more 
than a few years of substantial immunity.  Even so, sustained immunization programs have 
served to reduce the incidence of communicable disease.   Progress towards effective vaccines 
against malaria, tuberculosis and HIV-AIDS, the first of which poses no general threat to the 
populations of affluent countries, has been slow, although all three are targets for vaccine 
research.  The prospects for a general AIDS-vaccine are also clouded by the tendency of the 
virus to mutate freely, but scientific efforts are being vigorously applied to the problem. 
 
5.3 Welfare and Relief 
The activities of the public health commissions established in Italian cities during the Black 
Death had to be financed by additional taxes.  More importantly, the commissions’ strong 
powers challenged the church and business circles alike, often curtailing the functions of both 
in the interests of preserving the health of the community.  The commissions’ actions restricted 
the movement of goods and people, thereby increasing the costs of trade and commerce. These 
                                                 
8 For much of their history, Europeans were in close contact with livestock animals, from which a number of 
infectious diseases originated (Diamond, 1997).     29
often draconian measures also highlighted the city’s plight, and so further reduced its 
commercial transactions and trade with the outside world. The authorities in Milan and 
Florence backed the public health commissions in the interests of securing their cities’ long-
term economic health, and refused to capitulate to demands for looser policies that would have 
brought short-term relief to business (Hunter, 2003; Cohn, 2002). 
  The public relief measures took the form of the provision of food and goods, the burden 
of which was extensive where large portions of the population were poor.  By any reasonable 
interpretation of the term, about three-quarters of medieval Europe’s population were poor, and 
the taxes in question fell heavily on merchants and traders.  New knowledge brought new 
options.  Some governments embraced vaccination programs early in the 19
th Century,
9 and 
mass immunization campaigns were undertaken late in that century partly because they were a 
far less costly alternative to providing welfare after an outbreak.  
  The response to SARS is also instructive.  At the height of the epidemic, Asian 
countries made various efforts to mitigate its impact on businesses and households.  Hong 
Kong launched a package of relief measures with an estimated cost of $1.5 billion, mostly one-
time in nature, to tide companies over.  The elements of the package included refunding of 
employment taxes, concessions on utility bills for both households and businesses, a three-
month discount for tenants in public housing, short-term bank loans for hard hit sectors, and 
training and work-fare for the unemployed (Siu and Wong, 2003).  Singapore offered $132 
million in relief to businesses that were especially affected, although this represents only about 
10 percent of lost revenues.  Taipei authorized $1.4 billion to cover medical costs and business 
losses.  China introduced price controls for SARS drugs, offered free medical care to farmers 
and poor urban residents who became infected, extended subsidies and temporary exemptions 
on personal income tax to medical staff treating SARS patients, and introduced subsidized 
credit for tourism and air transport companies.  Even Malaysia and Thailand, which were not 
directly affected by the SARS outbreak, offered concessions to hard hit industries and pumped 
up government spending (Lee and McKibbin, 2003; World Bank, 2003).   
                                                 
9 By 1821, inoculation for smallpox had become mandatory in Bavaria, Denmark, Norway, Bohemia, Russia and 
Sweden; but many governments faced organized opposition from those who either “didn’t believe” in the practice 
or found it a violation of their civil rights (Morgan, 2002).  Today, most governments legally require 
immunizations, and prevent children from entering community programs, including schools, without them.   30
  The Asian economic crisis of 1995 had exposed the regional governments’ inability to 
deal with the effects of exogenous events.  The SARS epidemic, while short-lived, prompted 
public sector efforts to cushion its economic impacts.  Like the Black Death during the 14
th 
Century in Europe, SARS raised the profile and functions of government in managing society 
through a major shock. 
 
6.  Conclusions and Policy Implications 
By the mid-20
th Century most of the pathogens that had plagued Europe from early recorded 
times began to be brought under control more widely.  Vaccinations dealt with smallpox, 
measles and yellow fever, and general public health measures significantly reduced the 
incidence of dysentery, cholera and typhoid.  Moreover, a whole range of drug therapies led to 
fewer deaths and shorter bouts of illness.  The populations of what are now the OECD 
countries had became largely free of the more serious infectious diseases, the increasing 
control of which had contributed greatly to economic growth and welfare during the previous 
century – and at modest cost. 
  It is perhaps understandable that a sense of security, if not complacency, should have 
set in, and that with the apparent defeat of these old foes, the attention of affluent populations 
and their governments should have shifted to non-infectious chronic diseases, especially those 
of ageing, whose prevention is so much more difficult and whose treatment is relatively more 
expensive. The HIV/AIDS pandemic and the outbreaks of the Ebola virus and SARS have 
brought home the fact that new pathogens will continue to emerge, whether through the 
mutation of existing viruses or new transmissions from animals to man, even as final efforts 
are made to eradicate old ones.  They reinforce the lesson of history that allocating resources to 
public health amply and consistently yields a very good bargain.  
This conclusion holds especially in poor countries, where the burden of communicable 
diseases is high. Although the magnitude and nature of their economic effects vary, the returns 
to combating many of these diseases, even calculated on a narrow economic basis, are also 
high.  For example, the control of onchocerciasis in West Africa led to the opening up of fertile 
agricultural areas to farmers who had previously been forced to subsist on marginal lands.  The 
spread of HIV/AIDS in Africa and elsewhere will, unless checked, have severe economic 
consequences; but they will make themselves fully felt only over the longer term, as the heavy   31
losses of prime age adults weaken the mechanisms through which human capital is formed and 
accumulated.   
In principle, the world is far better equipped to deal with infectious diseases than it was 
in the past, but the practical problems are still formidable. The main source of trouble in any 
common property system is ensuring collective action among the individual agents.  When 
they are nation states, the touchy issue of sovereignty arises. A so-called “rogue country” with 
a weak commitment to, or capacity for, rigorous public health management can allow the 
spread of a virulent pathogen that threatens not only its own population, but also those outside 
its borders who come into contact with it. Since such countries are not uncommonly at odds in 
political and security matters with their neighbors or other groups of countries, the task of 
agreeing on the right course of action and how to share the costs, and then of actually 
implementing it, will demand skilful diplomacy or even sanctions. 
A more serious threat is likely to come from the more numerous “failed states”, which 
can exert little control over their borders or internal affairs, much less reach their populations 
with public health measures.
10  Widespread guerrilla conflicts, war or weak administration in 
post-conflict situations hinder efforts to prevent the emergence and spread of communicable 
diseases.  Indeed, Angola’s HIV/AIDS epidemic broke out after the return of soldiers from the 
conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where civil war had raged for decades.   
Movements of civilians, willing or forced, exacerbate the situation.   
The decay of public health systems in what can be called “faltering” states is also very 
troubling.  The chaos and poverty following the breakup of the Soviet Union led to intermittent 
and uneven immunization coverage, as well as deteriorating water and sanitation services, and 
so permitted the resurgence of infectious diseases.  Periodic outbreaks of measles and other 
diseases over the 1990s were clear evidence that the public health system had deteriorated 
(Jones and Revenga, 2000).  As a result, immigrants from the former Soviet Union often arrive 
in Western Europe without current, standard vaccinations.  Nigeria, whose reputation in most 
matters of governance and administration is unenviable, has also come under scrutiny once 
more, this time in connection with polio.  With a child immunization rate of just 17 per cent in 
1999, the government has refused to distribute vaccines and oversee vaccination programs in 
                                                 
10 A recent report by Eizenstat, Porter and Weinstein (2004) defines “failed states” and the associated threats to 
the US and the world at large that arise from ignoring and marginalizing rogue countries.  These countries offer 
fertile ground for instability of all kinds, including the spread of communicable diseases.   32
compliance with the WHO’s standards.  Flare ups of polio cases across the country reveal the 
government’s unwillingness or inability to deal the final blow to a disease that global, 
coordinated efforts have brought to the brink of eradication.  In many of these cases, the 
immunization technology exists, and often successful immunization coverage has been 
achieved in the past; but failed or faltering states cannot or will not perform basic public health 
functions, so placing the rest of the world at risk. 
The lessons from SARS are also instructive.  The international system displayed its 
strengths and effectiveness in dealing with epidemics, particularly in its instant response and 
ability to mobilize and coordinate essential expertise.  The flaw lay in the assumption that 
China, like other countries, not only monitors its epidemiological situation closely, but also 
would report any untoward developments quickly.  The WHO took immediate action when it 
was informed, belatedly, by the Chinese government of a new and unidentifiable pathogen of 
an unknown source; and so warned by the WHO, it was the governments of other countries in 
Asia and North America that promptly implemented the necessary public health interventions 
to bring the epidemic under control.  Once the severity of SARS and its highly communicable 
nature had become clear, the Chinese government cooperated with the international 
community.  Without the sequence of immediate international response, sharing of information 
and cooperation, the epidemic would have spiraled out of control and become a worldwide 
pandemic.  It should be added that had the pathogen been more aggressive or complex, the 
delay in initial reporting might have made such a disastrous outcome unavoidable.   
China’s reluctance fully to adopt modern methods for identifying, tracking and 
controlling epidemiological aberrations – notably by actually discouraging reporting and 
failing to quarantine the infected – was the main weakness in the whole system.  While the 
international community compensated for these failures, it was alerted too late to avert the 
resulting morbidity and mortality outside China.  The delays in identifying the emerging 
epidemic caused the direct and indirect economic losses sustained by China and other affected 
countries.    
Under current arrangements, the WHO and other international bodies are limited in 
what they can do. They can provide guidance and information based on the experiences and 
challenges facing its member countries, and they can promote best practice in member 
countries and collaboration among them.  While these bodies have no direct authority over   33
country-level surveillance and disease management, they are expected to compensate for lapses 
in country commitment and action that threaten international health.  What failed in the SARS 
epidemic, however, was precisely local authority and national action.  
The conclusions from this discussion are clear. The arm of the WHO that deals with 
communicable diseases should be maintained and supported, both in its capacity and in its 
functions. An operations and evaluation department should monitor the performance of 
member states and formally report their failures to adhere to established standards. Egregious 
and persistent cases should be referred to a central gremium, and thence, in the absence of the 
required corrective action, to the U.N. Security Council.  The World Bank, the IMF and other 
multilateral donors should make satisfactory performance in the sphere of public health – as 
measured by a basket of suitable indicators – an explicit element in the conditionality of their 
overall willingness to lend.  To the extent that performance so measured depends heavily on 
good administration and governance, there would be a correspondingly strong incentive to 
improve them.  Rich countries, in their bilateral relations as donors, should do the same.   
Public health is too important to the world’s growth and wellbeing to not be a central 
concern of developed and developing countries, and the organizations that represent their 
collective interests.  And because countries are increasingly interdependent, and infectious 
diseases affect not only the health of individuals but also of economic activity, disease control 
has become a truly global issue. 
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Source: Botswana and Uganda, Epidemiological Fact Sheets on HIV/AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Infections. 2004 Update.  












Disease Nature and Speed of 
Transmission 
Prevention of Transmission 





contact with infected 
animals or humans 
Symptoms: occur within 4-5 days 
Death: depends on individual, but 
can occur within 48 hours, 
especially of elderly.   
Case fatality rate: 10-15%  
Isolation and  quarantine of 









Virus  Through sexual contact, 
contact with blood, 
sharing of hypodermic 
needles of infected 
individuals 
Symptoms: 8-10 years delay; 
transmit infection when 
asymptomatic  
Death: avg. 7 years from diagnosis 
without treatment; undetermined 
with anti-retroviral treatment 
Prevent contact with bodily 
fluids of infected humans. Use 
of condoms, clean needles, 
treatment of STDs  
Influenza        1918-1919 Virus Aerosole:  airborne
particles, through close 
humans contact  
Symptoms within 48 hours of 
contact 
Death:  within a few days 








Bacteria  Through flea bites from 
infected carriers (usually 
rodents); can be  
airborne, transmitted by 
human droplets. 
Symptoms: manifested in bubos, 
death occurs in 3-4 days. 
Rapid transmission in densely 
populated areas. 
Average mortality: 60-70% 
Isolation; rat control References 
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